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Abstract. Kernel rootkits pose a signiﬁcant threat to computer systems
as they run at the highest privilege level and have unrestricted access to
the resources of their victims. Many current eﬀorts in kernel rootkit de-
fense focus on the detection of kernel rootkits – after a rootkit attack has
taken place, while the smaller number of eﬀorts in kernel rootkit preven-
tion exhibit limitations in their capability or deployability. In this paper
we present a kernel rootkit prevention system called NICKLE which ad-
dresses a common, fundamental characteristic of most kernel rootkits: the
need for executing their own kernel code. NICKLE is a lightweight, vir-
tual machine monitor (VMM) based system that transparently prevents
unauthorized kernel code execution for unmodiﬁed commodity (guest)
OSes. NICKLE is based on a new scheme called memory shadowing,
wherein the trusted VMM maintains a shadow physical memory for a
running VM and performs real-time kernel code authentication so that
only authenticated kernel code will be stored in the shadow memory.
Further, NICKLE transparently routes guest kernel instruction fetches
to the shadow memory at runtime. By doing so, NICKLE guarantees
that only the authenticated kernel code will be executed, foiling the ker-
nel rootkit’s attempt to strike in the ﬁrst place. We have implemented
NICKLE in three VMM platforms: QEMU+KQEMU, VirtualBox, and
VMware Workstation. Our experiments with 23 real-world kernel rootk-
its targeting the Linux or Windows OSes demonstrate NICKLE’s eﬀec-
tiveness. Furthermore, our performance evaluation shows that NICKLE
introduces small overhead to the VMM platform.
1 Introduction
Kernel-level rootkits have proven to be a formidable threat to computer sys-
tems: By subverting the operating system (OS) kernel, a kernel rootkit embeds
itself into the compromised kernel and stealthily inﬂicts damages with full, un-
restricted access to the system’s resources. Eﬀectively omnipotent in the com-
promised systems, kernel rootkits have increasingly been used by attackers to
hide their presence and prolong their control over their victims.
There have been a number of recent eﬀorts in mitigating the threat of kernel
rootkits and they can mainly be classiﬁed into two categories: (1) detecting the
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presence of kernel rootkits in a system [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and (2) preventing the
compromise of OS kernel integrity [6, 7]. In the ﬁrst category, Copilot [4] pro-
poses the use of a separate PCI card to periodically grab the memory image of
a running OS kernel and analyze it to determine if the kernel has been compro-
mised. The work which follows up Copilot [2] further extends that capability by
detecting the violation of kernel integrity using semantic speciﬁcations of static
and dynamic kernel data. SBCFI [3] reports violations of the kernel’s control
ﬂow integrity using the kernel’s control-ﬂow graph. One common attribute of
approaches in this category is the detection of a kernel rootkit’s presence based
on certain symptoms exhibited by the kernel after the kernel rootkit has already
struck. As a result, these approaches are, by design, not capable of preventing
kernel rootkit execution in the ﬁrst place.
In the second category, Livewire [6], based on a virtual machine monitor
(VMM), aims at protecting the guest OS kernel code and critical kernel data
structures from being modiﬁed. However, without modifying the original ker-
nel code, an attacker may choose to load malicious rootkit code into the kernel
space by either exploiting kernel vulnerabilities or leveraging certain kernel fea-
tures (e.g., loadable kernel module support in modern OSes). More recently,
SecVisor [7] is proposed as a hypervisor-based solution to enforce the W⊕X
property of memory pages of the guest machine, with the goal of preventing
unauthorized code from running with kernel-level privileges. SecVisor requires
modifying kernel source code and needs the latest hardware-based virtualiza-
tion support and thus does not support closed-source OSes or legacy hardware
platforms. Moreover, SecVisor is not able to function if the OS kernel has mixed
pages that contain both code and data. Unfortunately, such mixed kernel pages
do exist in modern OSes (e.g., Linux and Windows as shown in Section 2.2).
To complement the existing approaches, we present NICKLE (“No Instruction
Creeping into Kernel Level Executed”)1, a lightweight, VMM-based system that
provides an important guarantee in kernel rootkit prevention: No unauthorized
code can be executed at the kernel level. NICKLE achieves this guarantee on top
of legacy hardware and without requiring guest OS kernel modiﬁcation. As such,
NICKLE is readily deployable to protect unmodiﬁed guest OSes (e.g., Fedora
Core 3/4/5 and Windows 2K/XP) against kernel rootkits. NICKLE is based on
observing a common, fundamental characteristic of most modern kernel rootkits:
their ability to execute unauthorized instructions at the kernel level. By removing
this ability, NICKLE signiﬁcantly raises the bar for successfully launching kernel
rootkit attacks.
To achieve the “NICKLE” guarantee, we ﬁrst observe that a kernel rootkit
is able to access the entire physical address space of the victim machine. This
observation inspires us to impose restricted access to the instructions in the
kernel space: only authenticated kernel instructions can be fetched for execution.
Obviously, such a restriction cannot be enforced by the OS kernel itself. Instead,
1 With a slight abuse of terms, we use NICKLE to denote both the system itself and
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a natural strategy is to enforce such memory access restriction using the VMM,
which is at a privilege level higher than that of the (guest) OS kernel.
Our main challenge is to realize the above VMM-level kernel instruction fetch
restriction in a guest-transparent, real-time, and eﬃcient manner. An intuitive
approach would be to impose W⊕X on kernel memory pages to protect existing
kernel code and prevent the execution of injected kernel code. However, due to
the existence of mixed kernel pages in commodity OSes, this approach is not
viable for guest-transparent protection. To address that, we propose a VMM-
based memory shadowing scheme for NICKLE that will work in the face of mixed
kernel pages. More speciﬁcally, for a virtual machine (VM), the VMM creates
two distinct physical memory regions: a standard memory and a shadow memory.
The VMM enforces that the guest OS kernel cannot access the shadow memory.
Upon the VM’s startup, the VMM performs kernel code authentication and
dynamically copies authenticated kernel instructions from the standard memory
to the shadow memory. At runtime, any instruction executed in the kernel space
must be fetched from the shadow memory instead of from the standard memory.
To enforce this while maintaining guest transparency, a lightweight guest memory
access indirection mechanism is added to the VMM. As such, a kernel rootkit
will never be able to execute any of its own code as the code injected into the
kernel space will not be able to reach the shadow memory.
We have implemented NICKLE in three VMMs: QEMU[8] with the KQEMU
accelerator, VirtualBox [9], and VMware Workstation. Our evaluation results
show that NICKLE incurs a reasonable impact on the VMM platform (e.g.,
1.01% on QEMU+KQEMU and 5.45% on VirtualBox when running UnixBench).
NICKLE is shown capable of transparently protecting a variety of commodity
OSes, including RedHat 8.0 (Linux 2.4.18 kernel), Fedora Core 3 (Linux 2.6.15
kernel), Windows 2000, and Windows XP. Our results show that NICKLE is
able to prevent and gracefully respond to 23 real-world kernel rootkits targeting
the above OSes, without requiring details of rootkit attack vectors. Finally, our
porting experience indicates that the NICKLE design is generic and realizable
in a variety of VMMs.
2N I C K L E D e s i g n
2.1 Design Goals and Threat Model
Goals and Challenges. NICKLE has the following three main design goals:
First, as its name indicates, NICKLE should prevent any unauthorized code
from being executed in the kernel space of the protected VM. The challenges
of realizing this goal come from the real-time requirement of prevention as well
as from the requirement that the guest OS kernel should not be trusted to
initiate any task of the prevention – the latter requirement is justiﬁed by the
kernel rootkit’s highest privilege level inside the VM and the possible existence
of zero-day vulnerabilities inside the guest OS kernel. NICKLE overcomes these
challenges using the VMM-based memory shadowing scheme (Section 2.2). We4 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
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Fig.1. Memory shadowing scheme in NICKLE
note that the scope of NICKLE is focused on preventing unauthorized kernel
code execution. The prevention of other types of attacks (e.g., data-only attacks)
is a non-goal and related solutions will be discussed in Section 5.
Second, NICKLE should not require modiﬁcations to the guest OS kernel.
This allows commodity OSes to be supported “as is” without recompilation and
reinstallation. Correspondingly, the challenge in realizing this goal is to make
the memory shadowing scheme transparent to the VM with respect to both the
VM’s function and performance.
Third, the design of NICKLE should be generically portable to a range of
VMMs. Given this, the challenge is to ensure that NICKLE has a small footprint
within the VMM and remains lightweight with respect to performance impact.
In this paper we focus on supporting NICKLE in software VMMs. However, we
expect that the exploitation of recent hardware-based virtualization extensions
[10, 11] will improve NICKLE’s performance even further.
In addition, it is also desirable that NICKLE facilitate various ﬂexible response
mechanisms to be activated upon the detection of an unauthorized kernel code
execution attempt. A ﬂexible response, for example, is to cause only the oﬀending
process to fail without stopping the rest of the OS. The challenge in realizing
this is to initiate ﬂexible responses entirely from outside the protected VM and
minimize the side-eﬀects on the running OS.
Threat Model and System Assumption. We assume the following ad-
versary model when designing NICKLE: (1) The kernel rootkit has the highest
privilege level inside the victim VM (e.g., the root privilege in a UNIX system);
(2) The kernel rootkit has full access to the VM’s memory space (e.g., through
/dev/mem in Linux); (3) The kernel rootkit aims at stealthily maintaining and
hiding its presence in the VM and to do so, the rootkit will need to execute its
own (malicious) code in the kernel space. We note that such a need exists in
most kernel rootkits today, and we will discuss possible exceptions in Section 5.Guest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits 5
Meanwhile, we assume a trusted VMM that provides VM isolation. This as-
sumption is shared by many other VMM-based security research eﬀorts [1, 6, 12,
13, 14, 15]. We will discuss possible attacks (e.g., VM ﬁngerprinting) in Section
5. With this assumption, we consider the threat from DMA attacks launched
from physical hosts outside of the scope of this work.2
2.2 Enabling Scheme and Techniques
Memory Shadowing. The memory shadowing scheme enforces the “NICKLE”
property: For a VM, apart from its standard physical memory space, the VMM
also allocates a separate physical memory region as the VM’s shadow memory
(Figure 1) which is transparent to the VM and controlled by the VMM. Upon
the startup of the VM’s OS, all known-good, authenticated guest kernel instruc-
tions will be copied from the VM’s standard memory to the shadow memory
(Figure 1(a)). At runtime, when the VM is about to execute a kernel instruc-
tion, the VMM will transparently redirect the kernel instruction fetch to the
shadow memory (Figure 1(b)). All other memory accesses (to user code, user
data, and kernel data) will proceed unhindered in the standard memory.
The memory shadowing scheme is motivated by the observation that modern
computers deﬁne a single memory space for all code – both kernel code and user
code – and data. With the VMM running at a higher privilege level, we can now
“shadow” the guest kernel code space with elevated (VMM-level) privileges to
ensure that the guest OS kernel itself cannot access the shadowed kernel code
space containg the authenticated kernel instructions. By doing so, even if a kernel
rootkit is able to inject its own code into the VM’s standard memory, the VMM
will ensure that the malicious code never gets copied over to the shadow memory.
Moreover, an attempt to execute the malicious code can be caught immediately
due to the inconsistency between the standard and shadow memory contents.
The astute reader may be asking “How is NICKLE functionally diﬀerent from
W⊕X?” In essence, W⊕X is a scheme that enforces the property, “A given
memory page will never be both writable and executable at the same time.”
The basic premise behind this scheme is that if a page cannot be written to
and later executed from, code injection becomes impossible. There are two main
reasons why this scheme is not adequate for stopping kernel level rootkits:
First,W ⊕X is not able to protect mixed kernel pages with both code and
data, which do exist in current OSes. As a speciﬁc example, in a Fedora Core
3 VM (with the 32-bit 2.6.15 kernel and the NX protection), the Linux kernel
stores the main static kernel text in memory range [0xc0100000,0xc02dea50]
and keeps the system call table starting from virtual address 0xc02e04a0. No-
tice that the Linux kernel uses a large page size (2MB) to manage the physical
memory,3 which means that the ﬁrst two kernel pages cover memory ranges
2 There exists another type of DMA attack that is initiated from within a guest VM.
However, since the VMM itself virtualizes or mediates the guest DMA operations,
NICKLE can be easily extended to intercede and block them.
3 If the NX protection is disabled, those kernel pages containing static kernel text will
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[0xc0000000,0xc0200000) and [0xc0200000,0xc0400000), respectively. As a re-
sult, the second kernel page contains both code and data, and thus must be
marked both writable and executable – This conﬂicts with the W⊕X scheme.
Mixed pages also exist for accommodating the code and data of Linux loadable
kernel modules (LKMs) – an example will be shown in Section 4.1. For the Win-
dows XP kernel (with SP2), our investigation has conﬁrmed the existence of
mixed pages as well [16]. On the other hand, NICKLE is able to protect mixed
pages.4
Second,W ⊕X assumes only one execution privilege level while kernel rootkit
prevention requires further distinction between user and kernel code pages. For
example, a page may be set executable in user mode but non-executable in
kernel mode. In other words, the sort of permission desired is not W⊕X, but
W⊕KX (i.e. not writable and kernel-executable at the same time.) Still, we point
out that the enforcement of W⊕KX is not eﬀective for mixed kernel pages and,
regardless, not obvious to construct on current processors that do not allow such
ﬁne-grained memory permissions.
Another question that may be asked is, “Why adopt memory shadowing when
one could simply guard kernel code by keeping track of the ranges of valid
kernel code addresses ?” Indeed, NICKLE is guided by the principle of kernel
code guarding, but does so diﬀerently from the brute-force approach of track-
ing/checking kernel code address ranges – mainly for performance reasons. More
speciﬁcally, the brute-force approach could store the address ranges of valid
kernel code in a data structure (e.g., tree) with O(logN) search time. On the
other hand, memory shadowing allows us to locate the valid kernel instruction
in the shadow memory in O(1) time thus signiﬁcantly reducing the process-
ing overhead. In addition, memory shadowing makes it convenient to compare
the instructions in the shadow memory to those in the standard memory. If
they diﬀer (indicating malicious kernel code injection or modiﬁcation), a num-
ber of response actions can be implemented based on the diﬀerence (details in
Section 3).
Guest Memory Access Indirection. To realize the guest memory shadow-
ing scheme, two issues need to be resolved. First, how does NICKLE ﬁll up
the guest shadow memory with authenticated kernel code? Second, how does
NICKLE fetch authenticated kernel instructions for execution while detecting
and preventing any attempt to execute unauthorized code in the kernel space?
We note that our solutions have to be transparent to the guest OS (and thus
to the kernel rootkits). We now present the guest memory access indirection
technique to address these issues.
4 We also considered the option of eliminating mixed kernel pages. However, doing so
would require kernel source code modiﬁcation, which conﬂicts with our second design
goal. Even given source code access, mixed page elimination is still a complex task
(more than just page-aligning data). In fact, a kernel conﬁguration option with a
similar purpose exists in the latest Linux kernel (version 2.6.23). But after we enabled
the option, we still found more than 700 mixed kernel pages. NICKLE instead simply
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Guest memory access indirection is performed between the VM and its mem-
ory (standard and shadow) by a thin NICKLE module inside the VMM. It has
two main functions, kernel code authentication and copying at VM startup and
upon kernel module loading as well as guest physical address redirection at run-
time (Figure 1).
Kernel Code Authentication and Copying. To ﬁll up the shadow memory with
authenticated kernel instructions, the NICKLE module inside the VMM needs to
ﬁrst determine the accurate timing for kernel code authentication and copying.
To better articulate the problem, we will use the Linux kernel as an example.
There are two speciﬁc situations throughout the VM’s lifetime when kernel code
needs to be authorized and shadowed: One at the VM’s startup and one upon
the loading/unloading of loadable kernel modules (LKMs). When the VM is
starting up, the guest’s shadow memory is empty. The kernel bootstrap code
then decompresses the kernel. Right after the decompression and before any
processes are executed, NICKLE will use a cryptographic hash to verify the
integrity of the kernel code (this is very similar to level 4 in the secure bootstrap
procedure [17]) and then copy the authenticated kernel code from the standard
memory into the shadow memory (Figure 1(a)). As such, the protected VM will
start with a known clean kernel.
The LKM support in modern OSes complicates our design. From NICKLE’s
perspective, LKMs are considered injected kernel code and thus need to be au-
thenticated and shadowed before their execution. The challenge for NICKLE is
to externally monitor the guest OS and detect the kernel module loading/unload-
ing events in real-time. NICKLE achieves this by leveraging our earlier work on
non-intrusive VM monitoring and semantic event reconstruction [1, 14]. When
NICKLE detects the loading of a new kernel module, it intercepts the VM’s exe-
cution and performs kernel module code authentication and shadowing. The au-
thentication is performed by taking a cryptographic hash of the kernel module’s
code segment and comparing it with a known correct value, which is computed
a priori oﬀ-line and provided by the administrator or distribution maintainer.5
If the hash values don’t match, the kernel module’s code will not be copied to
the shadow memory.
Through kernel code authentication and copying, only authenticated kernel
code will be loaded into the shadow memory, thus blocking the copying of ma-
licious kernel rootkit code or any other code injected by exploiting kernel vul-
nerabilities, including zero-day vulnerabilities. It is important to note that nei-
ther kernel startup hashing nor kernel module hashing assumes trust in the
guest OS. Should the guest OS fail to cooperate, no code will be copied to the
shadow memory, and any execution attempts from that code will be detected and
refused.
Guest Physical Address Redirection. At runtime, the NICKLE module inside the
VMM intercepts the memory accesses of the VM after the “guest virtual address
→ guest physical address” translation. As such, NICKLE does not interfere
5 We have developed an oﬀ-line kernel module proﬁler that, given a legitimate kernel
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with – and is therefore transparent to – the guest OS’s memory access handling
procedure and virtual memory mappings. Instead, it takes the guest physical
address, determines the type of the memory access (kernel, user; code, data;
etc.), and routes it to either the standard or shadow memory (Figure 1(b)).
We point out that the interception of VM memory accesses can be provided
by existing VMMs (e.g., QEMU+KQEMU, VirtualBox, and VMware). NICKLE
builds on this interception capability by adding the guest physical address redi-
rection logic. First, using a simple method to check the current privilege level
of the processor, NICKLE determines whether the current instruction fetch is
for kernel code or for user code: If the processor is in supervisor mode (CPL=0
on x86), we infer that the fetch is for kernel code and NICKLE will verify and
route the instruction fetch to the shadow memory. Otherwise, the processor is in
user mode and NICKLE will route the instruction fetch to the standard memory.
Data accesses of either type are always routed to the standard memory.
One might object that an attacker may strive to ensure that his injected
kernel code will run when the processor is in user mode. However, this creates a
signiﬁcant challenge wherein the attacker would have to fundamentally change
a running kernel to operate in both supervisor and user mode without changing
any existing kernel code. The authors do not consider such a rootkit to be a
possibility without a severe loss of rootkit functionality.
Flexible Responses to Unauthorized Kernel Code Execution Attempts
If an unauthorized execution attempt is detected, a natural follow-up question
is, “How should NICKLE respond to an attempt to execute an unauthenticated
kernel instruction?” Given that NICKLE sits between the VM and its memory
and has a higher privilege level than the guest OS, it possesses a wide range of
options and capabilities to respond. We describe two response modes facilitated
by the current NICKLE system.
Rewrite mode: NICKLE will dynamically rewrite the malicious kernel code with
code of its own. The response code can range from OS-speciﬁc error handling
code to a well-crafted payload designed to clean up the impact of a rootkit
installation attempt. Note that this mode may require an understanding of the
guest OS to ensure that valid, sensible code is returned.
Break mode: NICKLE will take no action and route the instruction fetch to
the shadow memory. In the case where the attacker only modiﬁes the origi-
nal kernel code, this mode will lead to the execution of the original code – a
desirable situation. However, in the case where new code is injected into the
kernel, this mode will lead to an instruction fetch from presumably null content
(containing 0s) in the shadow memory. As such, break mode prevents malicious
kernel code execution but may or may not be graceful depending on how the OS
handles invalid code execution faults.
3 NICKLE Implementation
To validate the portability of the NICKLE design, we have implemented
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Workstation6. Since the open-source QEMU+KQEMU is the VMM platform
where we ﬁrst implemented NICKLE, we use it as the representative VMM to
describe our implementation details. For most of this section, we choose RedHat
8.0 as the default guest OS. We will also discuss the limitations of our current
prototype in supporting Windows guest OSes.
3.1 Memory Shadowing and Guest Memory Access Indirection
To implement memory shadowing, we have considered two options: (1) NICKLE
could interfere as instructions are executed; or (2) NICKLE could interfere when
instructions are dynamically translated. Note that dynamic instruction transla-
tion is a key technique behind existing software-based VMMs, which transpar-
ently translates guest machine code into native code that will run in the physical
host. We favor the second option for performance reasons: By being part of the
translator,NICKLEcantakeadvantageofthe factthattranslatedcode blocksare
cached. In QEMU+KQEMU, for example, guest kernel instructions are grouped
into “blocks” and are dynamically translated at runtime. After a block of code is
translated,it is storedina cacheto makeit availablefor future execution. In terms
of NICKLE, this means that if we intercede during code translation we need not
intercede as often as we would if we did so during code execution, resulting in a
smaller impact on system performance.
The pseudo-code for memory shadowing and guest memory access indirection
is shown in Algorithm 1. Given the guest physical address of an instruction to
be executed by the VM, NICKLE ﬁrst checks the current privilege level of the
processor (CPL). If the processor is in supervisor mode, NICKLE knows that it is
executing in kernel mode. Using the guest physical address, NICKLE compares
the content of the standard and shadow memories to determine whether the
kernel instruction to be executed is already in the shadow memory (namely
has been authenticated). If so, the kernel instruction is allowed to be fetched,
translated, and executed. If not, NICKLE will determine if the guest OS kernel
is being bootstrapped or a kernel module is being loaded. If either is the case,
the corresponding kernel text or kernel module code will be authenticated and,
if successful, shadowed into the shadow memory. Otherwise, NICKLE detects an
attempt to execute an unauthorized instruction in the kernel space and prevents
it by executing our response to the attempt.
In Algorithm 1, the way to determine whether the guest OS kernel is being
bootstrapped or a kernel module is being loaded requires OS-speciﬁc knowledge.
Using the Linux 2.4 kernel as an example, when the kernel’s startup 32 function,
located at physical address 0x00100000 or virtual address 0xc0100000 as
s h o w ni nt h eSystem.map ﬁle, is to be executed, we know that this is the ﬁrst
6 We acknowledge the VMware Academic Program for providing the source code. Due
to space and licensing constraints, however, the VMware port is not further discussed
or evaluated in this work. Some additional discussion of the port is available in our
technical report [16].10 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
Algorithm 1. Algorithm for Memory Shadowing and Guest Memory Access
Indirection
Input: (1) GuestPA: guest physical address of instruction to be executed; (2) ShadowMEM[]:
shadow memory; (3) StandardMEM[]: standard memory
if !IsUserMode(vcpu) AND ShadowMEM[GuestPA] != StandardMEM[GuestPA] then 1
if (kernel is being bootstrapped) OR (module is being loaded) then 2
Authenticate and shadow code; 3
else 4
Unauthorized execution attempt - Execute response; 5
end 6
end 7
Fetch, translate, and cache code; 8
instruction executed to load the kernel and we can intercede appropriately. For
kernel module loading, there is a speciﬁc system call to handle that. As such,
the NICKLE module inside the VMM can intercept the system call and perform
kernel module authentication and shadowing right before the module-speciﬁc
init module routine is executed.
In our implementation, the loading of LKMs requires special handling. More
speciﬁcally, providing a hash of a kernel module’s code space ends up being
slightly complicated in practice. This is due to the fact that kernel modules
are dynamically relocatable and hence some portions of the kernel module’s
code space may be modiﬁed by the module loading function. Accordingly, the
cryptographic hash of a loaded kernel module will be diﬀerent depending on
where it is relocated to. To solve this problem, we perform an oﬀ-line, a priori
proﬁling of the legitimate kernel module binaries. For each known good module
we calculate the cryptographic hash by excluding the portions of the module that
will be changed during relocation. In addition, we store a list of bytes aﬀected
by relocation so that the same procedure can be repeated by NICKLE during
runtime hash evaluation of the same module.
We point out that although the implementation of NICKLE requires certain
guest OS-speciﬁc information, it does not require modiﬁcations to the guest
OS itself. Still, for a closed-source guest OS (e.g., Windows), lack of information
about kernel bootstrapping and dynamic kernel code loading may lead to certain
limitations. For example, not knowing the timing and “signature” of dynamic
(legal) kernel code loading events in Windows, the current implementation of
NICKLE relies on the administrator to designate a time instance when all au-
thorized Windows kernel code has been loaded into the standard memory. Not
knowing the exact locations of the kernel code, NICKLE traverses the shadow
page table and copies those executable pages located in the kernel space from the
standard memory to the shadow memory, hence creating a “gold standard” to
compare future kernel code execution against. From this time on, NICKLE can
transparently protect the Windows OS kernel from executing any unauthorized
kernel code. Moreover, this limited implementation can be made complete when
the relevant information becomes available through vendor disclosure or reverse
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3.2 Flexible Response
In response to an attempt to execute an unauthorized instruction in the kernel
space, NICKLE provides two response modes. Our initial implementation of
NICKLE simply re-routes the instruction fetch to the shadow memory for a
string of zeros (break mode). As to be shown in our experiments, this produces
some interesting outcomes: a Linux guest OS would react to this by triggering a
kernel fault and terminating the oﬀending process. Windows, on the other hand,
reacts to the NICKLE response by immediately halting with a blue screen – a
less graceful outcome.
In search of a more ﬂexible response mode, we ﬁnd that by rewriting the
oﬀending instructions at runtime (rewrite mode), NICKLE can respond in a less
disruptive way. We also observe that most kernel rootkits analyzed behave the
following way: They ﬁrst insert a new chunk of malicious code into the kernel
space; then they somehow ensure their code is call’d as a function. With this
observation, we let NICKLE dynamically replace the code with return -1;,
which in assembly is: mov $0xffffffff, %eax; ret.T h em a i nk e r n e lt e x to r
the kernel module loading process will interpret this as an error and gracefully
handle it: Our experiments with Windows 2K/XP, Linux 2.4, and Linux 2.6 guest
OSes all conﬁrm that NICKLE’s rewrite mode is able to handle the malicious
kernel code execution attempt by triggering the OS to terminate the oﬀending
process without causing a fault in the OS.
3.3 Porting Experience
We have experienced no major diﬃculty in porting NICKLE to other VMMs. The
NICKLE implementations in both VMMs are lightweight: The SLOC (source
lines of code) added to implement NICKLE in QEMU+KQEMU, VirtualBox,
and VMware Workstation are 853, 762, and 1181 respectively. As mentioned
earlier, we ﬁrst implemented NICKLE in QEMU+KQEMU. It then took less
than one week for one person to get NICKLE functional in VirtualBox 1.5.0
OSE, details of which can be found in our technical report [16].
4 NICKLE Evaluation
4.1 Eﬀectiveness Against Kernel Rootkits
We have evaluated the eﬀectiveness of NICKLE with 23 real-world kernel rootk-
its. They consist of nine Linux 2.4 rootkits, seven Linux 2.6 rootkits, and seven
Windows rootkits7 that can infect Windows 2000 and/or XP. The selected rootk-
its cover the main attack platforms and attack vectors thus providing a good
representation of the state-of-the-art kernel rootkit technology. Table 1 shows
7 There is a Windows rootkit named hxdef or Hacker Defender, which is usually clas-
siﬁed as a user-level rootkit. However, since hxdef contains a device driver which will
be loaded into the kernel, we consider it a kernel rootkit in this paper.12 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
Table 1. Eﬀectiveness of NICKLE in detecting and preventing 23 real-world kernel
rootkits (DKOM
† is a common rootkit technique which directly manipulates kernel
objects; “partial”
‡ means the in-kernel component of the Hacker Defender rootkit fails;
BSOD
§ stands for “Blue Screen Of Death”)
Outcomeo fN I C K L ER e s p o n s e
Guest OS Rootkit Attack Vector Rewrite Mode Break Mode
Prevented? Outcome Prevented? Outcome
Linux 2.4
adore 0.42, 0.53 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
adore-ng 0.56 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
knark LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
rkit 1.01 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
kbdv3 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
allroot LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
rial LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
Phantasmagoria LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
SucKIT 1.3b /dev/kmem  Installation fails silently  Seg. fault
Linux 2.6
adore-ng 0.56 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
eNYeLKM v1.2 LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
sk2rc2 /dev/kmem  Installation fails  Seg. fault
superkit /dev/kmem  Installation fails  Seg. fault
mood-nt 2.3 /dev/kmem  Installation fails  Seg. fault
override LKM  insmod fails  Seg. fault
Phalanx b6 /dev/mem  Installation crashes  Seg. fault
Windows 2K/XP
FU DKOM
†  Driver loading fails  BSOD
§
FUTo DKOM  Driver loading fails  BSOD
he4hook 215b6 Driver  Driver loading fails  BSOD
hxdef 1.0.0 revisited Driver partial
‡ Driver loading fails  BSOD
hkdoor11 Driver  Driver loading fails  BSOD
yyt hac Driver  Driver loading fails  BSOD
NT Rootkit Driver  Driver loading fails  BSOD
our experimental results: NICKLE is able to detect and prevent the execution of
malicious kernel code in all experiments using both rewrite and break response
modes. Finally, we note that NICKLE in all three VMMs is able to achieve the
same results. In the following, we present details of two representative experi-
ments. Some additional experiments are presented in [16].
SucKIT Rootkit Experiment. The SucKIT rootkit [18] for Linux 2.4 infects
the Linux kernel by directly modifying the kernel through the /dev/kmem inter-
face. During installation SucKIT ﬁrst allocates memory within the kernel, injects
its code into the allocated memory, and then causes the code to run as a function.
Figure 2 shows NICKLE preventing the SucKIT installation. The window on the
left shows the VM running RedHat 8.0 (with 2.4.18 kernel), while the window on
the right shows the NICKLE output. Inside the VM, one can see that the SucKIT
installation program fails and returns an error message “Unable to handle ker-
nel NULL pointer dereference”. This occurs because NICKLE (operating in break
mode) foils the execution of injected kernel code by fetching a string of zeros from
the shadow memory, which causes the kernel to terminate the rootkit installation
program. Interestingly, when NICKLE operates in rewrite mode, it rewrites the
malicious code and forcesit to return −1. However,it seems that SucKIT does not
bother to check the return value and so the rootkit installation just fails silently
and the kernel-level functionality does not work.
In the right-side window in Figure 2, NICKLE reports the authentication
and shadowing of sequences of kernel instructions starting from the initial BIOSGuest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits 13
Fig.2. NICKLE/QEMU+KQEMU foils the SucKIT rootkit (guest OS: RedHat 8.0)
bootstrap code to the kernel text as well as its initialization code and ﬁnally to
various legitimate kernel modules. In this experiment, there are ﬁve legitimate
kernel modules, parport.o, parport pc.o, ieee1394.o, ohci1394,a n dautofs.o,a l l
authenticated and shadowed. The code portion of the kernel module begins with
an oﬀset of 0x60 bytes in the ﬁrst page. The ﬁrst 0x60 bytes are for the kernel
module header, which stores pointers to information such as the module’s name,
size, and other entries linking to the global linked list of loaded kernel modules.
This is another example of mixed kernel pages with code and data in Linux
(Section 2.2).
FU Rootkit Experiment. The FU rootkit [19] is a Windows rootkit that
loads a kernel driver and proceeds to manipulate kernel data objects. The ma-
nipulation will allow the attacker to hide certain running processes or device
drivers loaded in the kernel. When running FU on NICKLE, the driver is unable
to load successfully as the driver-speciﬁc initialization code is considered unau-
thorized kernel code. Figure 3 compares NICKLE’s two response modes against
FU’s attempt to load its driver. Under break mode, the OS simply breaks with
a blue screen. Under rewrite mode, the FU installation program fails (“Failed to
initialize driver.”) but the OS does not crash.
4.2 Impact on Performance
To evaluate NICKLE’s impact on system performance we have performed
benchmark-based measurements on both VMMs – with and without NICKLE.
The physical host in our experiments has an Intel 2.40GHz processor and 3GB of
RAM running Ubuntu Linux 7.10. QEMU version 0.9.0 with KQEMU 1.3.0pre11
or VirtualBox 1.5.0 OSE is used where appropriate. The VM’s guest OS is
Redhat 8.0 with a custom compile of a vanilla Linux 2.4.18 kernel and is
started inuniprocessor mode with the default amount of memory (256MB for14 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
(a) Under break mode (b) Under rewrite mode
Fig.3. Comparison of NICKLE/QEMU+KQEMU’s response modes against the FU
rootkit (guest OS: Windows 2K)
Table 2. Software conﬁguration for performance evaluation
Item Version Conﬁguration Item Version Conﬁguration
Redhat 8.0 Using Linux 2.4.18 Apache 2.0.59 Using the default high-performance
conﬁguration ﬁle
Kernel 2.4.18 Standard kernel compilation ApacheBench 2.0.40-dev -c3 -t 60 <url/file>
Unixbench 4.1.0 -10 index
Table 3. Application benchmark results
QEMU+KQEMU VirtualBox
Benchmark w/o NICKLE w/NICKLE Overhead w/o NICKLE w/ NICKLE Overhead
Kernel Compiling 231.490s 233.529s 0.87% 156.482s 168.377s 7.06%
insmod 0.088s 0.095s 7.34% 0.035s 0.050s 30.00%
Apache 351.714 req/s 349.417 req/s 0.65% 463.140 req/s 375.024 req/s 19.03%
VirtualBox and 128MB for QEMU+KQEMU). Table 2 shows the software con-
ﬁguration for the measurement. For the Apache benchmark, a separate ma-
chine connected to the host via a dedicated gigabit switch is used to launch
ApacheBench. When applicable, benchmarks are run 10 times and the results
are averaged.
Three application-level benchmarks (Table 3) and one micro-benchmark
(Table 4) are used to evaluate the system. The ﬁrst application benchmark is
a kernel compilation test: A copy of the Linux 2.4.18 kernel is uncompressed,
conﬁgured, and compiled. The total time for these operations is recorded and
a lower number is better. Second, the insmod benchmark measures the amount
of time taken to insert a module (in this case, the ieee1394 module) into the
kernel and again lower is better. Third, the ApacheBench program is used to
measure the VM’s throughput when serving requests for a 16KB ﬁle. In this
case, higher is better. Finally, the UnixBench micro-benchmark is executed to
evaluate the more ﬁne-grained performance impact of NICKLE. The numbersGuest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits 15
Table 4. UnixBench results (for the ﬁrst two data columns, higher is better)
QEMU+KQEMU VirtualBox
Benchmark w/o NICKLE w/NICKLE Overhead w/o NICKLE w/ NICKLE Overhead
Dhrystone 659.3 660.0 -0.11% 1843.1 1768.6 4.04%
Whetstone 256.0 256.0 0.00% 605.8 543.0 10.37%
Execl 126.0 127.3 -1.03% 205.4 178.2 13.24%
File copy 256B 45.5 46 -1.10% 2511.8 2415.7 3.83%
File copy 1kB 67.6 68.2 -0.89% 4837.5 4646.9 3.94%
File copy 4kB 128.4 127.4 0.78% 7249.9 7134.3 1.59%
Pipe throughput 41.7 40.7 2.40% 4646.9 4590.9 1.21%
Process creation 124.7 118.2 5.21% 92.1 85.3 7.38%
Shell scripts (8) 198.3 196.7 0.81% 259.2 239.8 7.48%
System call 20.9 20.1 3.83% 2193.3 2179.9 0.61%
Overall 106.1 105.0 1.01% 1172.6 1108.7 5.45%
reported in Table 4 are an index where higher is better. It should be noted that
the benchmarks are meant primarily to compare a NICKLE-enhanced VMM
with the corresponding unmodiﬁed VMM. These numbers are not meant to
compare diﬀerent VMMs (such as QEMU+KQEMU vs. VirtualBox).
QEMU+KQEMU. The QEMU+KQEMU implementation of NICKLE ex-
hibits very low overhead in most tests. In fact, a few of the benchmark tests show
a slight performance gain for the NICKLE implementation, but we consider these
results to signify that there is no noticeable slowdown due to NICKLE for that
test. From Table 3 it can be seen that both the kernel compilation and Apache
tests come in below 1% overheard. The insmod test has a modest overhead,
7.3%, primarily due to the fact that NICKLE must calculate and verify the hash
of the module prior to copying it into the shadow memory. Given how infre-
quently kernel module insertion occurs in a running system, this overhead is not
a concern. The UnixBench tests in Table 4 further testify to the eﬃciency of the
NICKLE implementation in QEMU+KQEMU, with the worst-case overhead of
any test being 5.21% and the overall overhead being 1.01%. The low overhead of
NICKLE is due to the fact that NICKLE’s modiﬁcations to the QEMU control
ﬂow only take eﬀect while executing kernel code (user-level code is executed by
the unmodiﬁed KQEMU accelerator).
VirtualBox. The VirtualBox implementation has a more noticeable overhead
than the QEMU+KQEMU implementation, but still runs below 10% for the
majority of the tests. The kernel compilation test, for example, exhibits about
7% overheard; while the UnixBench suite shows a little less than 6% overall.
The Apache test is the worst performer, showing a 19.03% slowdown. This can
be attributed to the heavy number of user/kernel mode switches that occur
while serving web requests. It is during the mode switches that the Virtual-
Box implementation does its work to ensure only veriﬁed code will be executed
directly [16], hence incurring overhead. The insmod test shows a large perfor-
mance degradation, coming in at 30.0%. This is due to the fact that module
insertion on the VirtualBox implementation entails the VMM leaving native
code execution as well as verifying the module. However, this is not a concern
as module insertion is an uncommon event at runtime. Table 4 shows that the16 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
worst performing UnixBench test (Execl) results in an overhead of 13.24%. This
result is most likely due to a larger number of user/kernel mode switches that
occur during that test.
In summary, our benchmark experiments show that NICKLE incurs minimal
to moderate impact on system performance, relative to that of the respective
original VMMs.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several issues related to NICKLE. First, the goal of
NICKLE is to prevent unauthorized code from executing in the kernel space,
but not to protect the integrity of kernel-level control ﬂows. This means that
it is possible for an attacker to launch a “return-into-libc” style attack within
the kernel by leveraging only the existing authenticated kernel code. Recent
work by Shacham [20] builds a powerful attacker who can execute virtually
arbitrary code using only a carefully crafted stack that causes jumps and calls
into existing code. Fortunately, this approach cannot produce persistent code to
be called on demand from other portions of the kernel. And Petroni et al. [3]
found that 96% of the rootkits they surveyed require persistent code changes.
From another perspective, an attacker may also be able to directly or indirectly
inﬂuence the kernel-level control ﬂow by manipulating certain non-control data
[21]. However, without its own kernel code, this type of attack tends to have
limited functionality. For example, all four stealth rootkit attacks described in
[22] need to execute their own code in the kernel space and hence will be defeated
by NICKLE. Meanwhile, solutions exist for protecting control ﬂow integrity [3,
23, 24] and data ﬂow integrity [25], which can be leveraged and extended to
complement NICKLE.
Second, the current NICKLE implementation does not support self-modifying
kernel code. This limitation can be removed by intercepting the self-modifying
behavior (e.g., based on the translation cache invalidation resulting from the
self-modiﬁcation) and re-authenticating and shadowing the kernel code after the
modiﬁcation.
Third, NICKLE currently does not support kernel page swapping. Linux does
not swap out kernel pages, but Windows does have this capability. To support
kernel page swapping in NICKLE, it would require implementing the introspec-
tion of swap-out and swap-in events and ensuring that the page being swapped
in has the same hash as when it was swapped out. Otherwise an attacker could
modify swapped out code pages without NICKLE noticing. This limitation has
not yet created any problem in our experiments, where we did not encounter
any kernel level page swapping.
Fourth, targeting kernel-level rootkits, NICKLE is ineﬀective against user-
level rootkits. However, NICKLE signiﬁcantly elevates the trustworthiness of
the guest OS, on top of which anti-malware systems can be deployed to defend
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Fifth, the deployment of NICKLE increases the memory footprint for the
protected VM. In the worst case, memory shadowing will double the physical
memory usage. As our future work, we can explore the use of demand-paging
to eﬀectively reduce the extra memory requirement to the actual amount of
memory needed. Overall, it is reasonable and practical to trade memory space
for elevated OS kernel security.
Finally, we point out that NICKLE assumes a trusted VMM to achieve the
“NICKLE” property. This assumption is needed because it essentially establishes
the root-of-trust of the entire system and secures the lowest-level system access.
We also acknowledge that a VM environment can potentially be ﬁngerprinted
and detected [26, 27] by attackers so that their malware can exhibit diﬀerent
behavior [28]. We can improve the ﬁdelity of the VM environment (e.g., [29,
30]) to thwart some of the VM detection methods. Meanwhile, as virtualization
continues to gain popularity, the concern over VM detection may become less
signiﬁcant as attackers’ incentive and motivation to target VMs increases.
6 Related Work
Rootkit Prevention Through Kernel Integrity Enforcement. The ﬁrst
area of related work includes recent eﬀorts in enforcing kernel integrity to thwart
kernel rootkit installation or execution. Livewire [6], based on a software-based
VMM, aims at protecting the guest OS kernel code and critical data structures
from being modiﬁed. However, an attacker may choose to load malicious rootkit
code into the kernel space without manipulating the original kernel code.
SecVisor [7] is a closely related work that leverages new hardware extensions to
enforce life-time kernel integrity and provide a guarantee similar to “NICKLE”.
However, there are two main diﬀerences between SecVisor and NICKLE: First,
the deployment of SecVisor requires modiﬁcation to OS kernel source code as
well as the latest hardware support for MMU and IOMMU virtualization. In
comparison, NICKLE is a guest-transparent solution that supports guest OSes
“as is” on top of legacy hardware platforms. In particular, NICKLE does not rely
on the protection of any guest OS data structures (e.g., the GDT – global de-
scriptor table). Second, SecVisor is developed to enforce the W⊕X principle for
the protected VM kernel code. This principle intrinsically conﬂicts with mixed
kernel pages, which exist in current OSes (e.g., Linux and Windows). NICKLE
works in the presence of mixed kernel pages. OverShadow [31] adopts a similar
technique of memory shadowing at the VMM level with the goal of protecting
application memory pages from modiﬁcation by even the OS itself. In compar-
ison, NICKLE has a diﬀerent goal and aims at protecting the OS from kernel
rootkits.
To ensure kernel code integrity, techniques such as driver signing [32] as well
as various forms of driver veriﬁcation [5, 33] have also been proposed. These
techniques are helpful in verifying the identity or integrity of the loaded driver.
However, a kernel-level vulnerability could potentially be exploited to bypass18 R. Riley, X. Jiang, and D. Xu
these techniques. In comparison, NICKLE operates at the lower VMM level and
is capable of blocking zero-day kernel-level exploitations.
Symptom-Driven Kernel Rootkit Detection. The second area of related
work is the modeling and speciﬁcation of symptoms of a rootkit-infected OS
kernel which can be used to detect kernel rootkits. Petroni et al. [4] and Zhang
et al. [34] propose the use of external hardware to grab the runtime OS memory
image and detect possible rootkit presence by spotting certain kernel code in-
tegrity violations (e.g., rootkit-inﬂicted kernel code manipulation). More recent
works further identify possible violations of semantic integrity of dynamic ker-
nel data [2] or state based control-ﬂow integrity of kernel code [3]. Generalized
control-ﬂow integrity [23] may have strong potential to be used as a prevention
technique, but as yet has not been applied to kernel integrity. Other solutions
such as Strider GhostBuster [35] and VMwatcher [1] target the self-hiding na-
ture of rootkits and infer rootkit presence by detecting discrepancies between the
views of the same system from diﬀerent perspectives. All the above approaches
are, by design, for the detection of a kernel rootkit after it has infected a system.
Instead, NICKLE is for the prevention of kernel rootkit execution in the ﬁrst
place.
Attestation-Based Rootkit Detection. The third area of related work
is the use of attestation techniques to verify the software running on a target
platform. Terra [13] and other code attestation schemes [36, 37, 38] are proposed
to verify software that is being located into the memory for execution. These
schemes are highly eﬀective in providing the load-time attestation guarantee.
Unfortunately, they are not able to provide run-time kernel integrity.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of NICKLE, a
VMM-based approach that transparently detects and prevents the launching of
kernel rootkit attacks against guest VMs. NICKLE achieves the “NICKLE”
guarantee, which foils the common need of existing kernel rootkits to exe-
cute their own unauthorized code in the kernel space. NICKLE is enabled by
the scheme of memory shadowing, which achieves guest transparency through
the guest memory access indirection technique. NICKLE’s portability has been
demonstrated by its implementation in three VMM platforms. Our experiments
show that NICKLE is eﬀective in preventing 23 representative real-world kernel
rootkits that target a variety of commodity OSes. Our measurement results show
that NICKLE adds only modest overhead to the VMM platform.
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